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1 INTRODUCTION
One of the major issues with the integration of renewable energy
sources into the power grid is the increased uncertainty and variabil-
ity that they bring. If this uncertainty is not suciently addressed,
it will limit the further penetration of renewables into the grid and
even result in blackouts. Compared to energy storage, Demand
Response (DR) has advantages to provide reserves to the load serv-
ing entities (LSEs) in a cost-eective and environmentally friendly
way. DR programs work by changing customers’ loads when the
power grid experiences a contingency such as a mismatch between
supply and demand. Uncertainties from both the customer-side and
LSE-side make designing algorithms for DR a major challenge.
is paper makes the following main contributions: (i) We pro-
pose DR control policies based on the optimal structures of the
oine solution. (ii) A distributed algorithm is developed for imple-
menting the control policies without eciency loss. (iii) We further
oer an enhanced policy design by allowing exibilities into the
commitment level. (iv) We perform real world trace based numer-
ical simulations which demonstrate that the proposed algorithms
can achieve near optimal social cost. Details can be found in our
extended version [3].
2 OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
e goal is to simultaneously decide the capacity planning κ and
a practical DR policy x(D,δ) to minimize the expected social cost
caused by a random aggregate supply-demand mismatch D (which
captures mismatches from both the generation side and the load
side).
min
κ,x(D,δ )
Ccap(κ)
+ ED,δ,C(·)
[∑
i
Ci (xi (D,δi )) +Cg
(
D −
∑
i
xi (D,δi )
)]
s.t. max
D,δ
{
D −
∑
i
xi (D,δi )
}
≤ κ (1a)
min
D,δ
{
D −
∑
i
xi (D,δi )
}
≥ −κ . (1b)
where δi and Ci (·) are respectively for customer i the individual
random demand mismatch and random cost function (e.g. aix2i
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Figure 1: Annual Social Cost vs. (a) price of capacity in LIN
compared to dierent baselines, (b) level of commitment in
LIN+(ρ) for dierent amounts of Relative Standard Devia-
tions (RSD) on the customer cost parameter a.
with ai as a random coecient) for performing DR, Ccap(·) and
Cg(·) are respectively the LSE’s cost for purchasing capacity and
for managing the remaining mismatch, We note that (1a) and (1b)
are worst-case constraints so that the remaining mismatch does not
go beyond the purchased capacity. e two main challenges of this
problem are (i) deciding the optimal capacity κ before implementing
the DR policy, and (ii) optimizing an online DR policy. e cost
functions are assumed to be convex.
Optimal Real-time Solution
We provide the characterization of the optimal real-time solution
to reveal special structures that we take advantage of in our policy
design (Section 3). e real-time DR decision problem for a given
capacity κ at a time t is:
R(κ; t) := min
x(t )
∑
i
Ci (xi (t); t) +Cg
(
D(t) −
∑
i
xi (t)
)
(2a)
s.t. − κ ≤ D(t) −
∑
i
xi (t) ≤ κ . (2b)
Lemma 2.1. Problem (2) is a convex optimization problem.
e Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of this
real-time problem show that when the capacity constraint on κ
is non-binding, i.e., −κ < D(t) − ∑j ∈V x∗j (t) < κ, it implies that
C ′i (x∗i (t)) = C ′g(D(t) −
∑
j ∈V x∗j (t)). is means that the marginal
cost for each customer to provide demand response is the same, all
of which is equal to the LSE’s marginal cost to tolerate the mismatch.
Furthermore, we get the following lemma which helps determine
the optimal capacity in the next subsection:
Lemma 2.2. R(κ; t) as dened by (2) is a convex function of κ.
Additionally the negative of the sum of dual variables θ + θ from
constraint (2b) is the subgradient of R(κ; t) w.r.t. κ.
Optimal Capacity
We can use the real-time decision problem (2) to decide what the
optimal capacity should be in the following capacity problem:
min
κ
Ccap(κ) + ED,δ,C(·) [R(κ; t)] (3)
Theorem 2.3. (3) is a convex optimization problem over κ.
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e KKT optimality conditions for the capacity problem and
Lemma 2.2 give us the following result:
C ′cap(κ∗) = ED,δ,C(·)
[
θ (κ∗; t)] (4)
where we use the notation of θ (κ; t) as a function to represent the
sum of the optimal dual variables for constraint (2b). is means
that for an optimal capacity, the marginal cost of capacity must
equal the expected dual price for that capacity constraint.
3 POLICY DESIGN
Linear policy
Motivated by the desire to nd a simple DR policy x(D,δi ∈V ) that
preserves convexity, we focus on a simple but powerful linear de-
mand response policy that is a function of total and local net de-
mands: xi (D,δi ) = αiD + βiδi + γi . (5)
Intuitively, there are three components: αiD implies each customer
shares some (predened) fraction of the global mismatch D; βiδi
means customer i may need to take additional responsibility for the
mismatch due to his own demand uctuation and estimation error;
nally, γi , the constant part, can help when the random variables
E[D] and/or E[δi ] is nonzero. en the LSE needs to solve (1) with
(5) to obtain the optimal parameters for the linear contract, i.e.,
α , β ,γ , as well as the optimal capacity κ.
Theorem 3.1. Problem (1) with the linear policy (5) is a convex
optimization problem.
Distributed algorithm
In most cases, the LSE’s information on the customers’ cost func-
tions is much less accurate than the customer themselves’. is
can also be due to privacy concerns. To handle this, we design a
distributed algorithm so that the LSE does not need the information
of the customer cost functions, while still achieving the optimal
(κLIN ,α ∗, β∗,γ∗) for Problem (1) with the linear policy (5). We in-
troduce and substitute (ui ,vi ,wi ) for (αi , βi ,γi ) in each customer’s
estimated cost function Cˆi (·) and the LSE uses the corresponding
price set (pii , λi , µi ) to incentivize each customer to change their
parameters.
Distributed Algorithm for LIN:
(0) Initialization: (α , β,γ , u, v,w,pi ,λ, µ) := 0.
(1) LSE: receives (ui ,vi ,wi ) from each customer i ∈ V .
• Solves Problem (9) and updates (α , β,γ ) with the
optimal solution.
• Updates the stepsize:
η =
ζ /k
| |(α , β,γ ) − (u, v,w)| |2 (6)
where ζ is a small constant and k is the iteration
number.
• Updates the dual prices, ∀i ∈ V:
(pii , λi , µi ) := (pii , λi , µi ) + η ((αi , βi , γi ) − (ui , vi , wi )) (7)
• Sends (pii , λi , µi ) to the each customer respectively.
(2) Customer i ∈ V: receives (pii , λi , µi ) from LSE.
• Solves Problem (8) and updates (ui ,vi ,wi ) with op-
timal solution.
• Sends (ui ,vi ,wi ) to the LSE.
(3) Repeat Steps 1-2 until | |(α , β ,γ ) − (u, v,w)| |2 ≤ ϵ where
ϵ is the tolerance on magnitude of the subgradient.
us piiui +λivi + µiwi is the total payment to customer i for the
linear demand response policy. e individual customer’s problem
for a given set of prices is
min
ui ,vi ,wi
ED,δi
[
Cˆi (uiD +viδi +wi )
] − piiui − λivi − µiwi (8)
while the LSE’s optimization problem among all the customers is
min
α ,β,γ,κ
Ccap (κ) +
∑
i ∈V
(piiαi + λiβi + µiγi )
+ ED,δ
[
Cg
(∑
i ∈V
(δi − αiD − βiδi − γi ) − r
)]
(9)
s.t. (1a), (1b)
In order for the customers and the LSE to negotiate and obtain the
optimal prices we use the Subgradient Method (see [2] Chapter 6).
Theorem 3.2. e distributed algorithm’s trajectory of dual prices
converge to the optimal dual prices for Problem (1) with (5).
Flexible Commitment Demand Response
One potential drawback of LIN is that customers are forced to follow
the specied linear policy. In some cases, customers may face a very
high cost to follow the policy, e.g., when there are some critical jobs
to be nished, represented by a larger ai (t). Motivated by this obser-
vation and some existing regulation service programs, we modify
the LIN policy to add some exibility limited by a single parameter
ρ. We call the new algorithm LIN+(ρ) where each customer has up
to 1 − ρ (in percentage) of the time slots in which they do not need
to follow the policy according to her realized αi (t). In other words,
she may let xi (t) = 0 for such timeslots. Note that although we add
the exibility to LIN in this paper, the approach is in fact general
and can be applied to a wide range of fully commied programs.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Experimental Setup. We simulate an LSE supplying power to 300
customers. Each customer has a particular demand of load which
we model by utilizing the traces obtained from the UMass Trace
Repository [1].
LIN is close to optimal. Figure 1(a) compares the social cost of LIN
to baselines using the oine optimal OPT (3) as a lower bound and
sequential algorithm SEQ as an upper bound. e baseline SEQ rst
makes a conservative capacity planning decision about κ, and then
sets a price for DR to obtain a targeted amount of DR.e social cost
of LIN is no more than 10% higher compared to the fundamental
limit OPT and is signicantly less than SEQ. e social cost of SEQ
increases rapidly with increasing capacity prices because of the
conservative 90kW capacity used by SEQ to protect the system from
any leover mismatch.
Additional cost savings brought by LIN+(ρ). Depicted in Figure 1(b),
as ρ decreases from 1, the social cost rst decreases due to the fact
that some customers with very high ai (t) are allowed to not provide
demand response. As ρ continues to decrease, we have more cus-
tomers not providing demand response and the cost actually goes up
again. is is because the LSE’s penalty for the mismatch becomes
larger than the costs of customers to provide demand response. At
ρ = 0.8, it achieves a cost savings 7-8%. Recall that the gap between
LIN and the oine optimal OPT is about 10%. is means LIN+(ρ∗)
achieves near optimal cost.
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